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Psychotic Aspects of Premenstrual Tension
Naoma Lee Stewart*
W HAT LEGAL CONCLUSIONS may be drawn from the newly
developing medical understanding of premenstrual ten-
sion in women, insofar as mental competency and criminal law
are concerned? That is the subject of this paper. The legal con-
clusions therefrom in the field of negligence (automobile acci-
dents) were discussed by the writer in the January 1957 issue
of this law review.
The Medical Background
Since ancient times the strange physical and emotional dis-
turbances to which women are subject in connection with their
menstrual cycle have been well known, but only partly under-
stood.' Almost startling in its modern sound is the prophet
Jeremiah's analogy in his Lamentations between the desolate,
chaotic melancholy of his era and the condition of a "menstruous
woman." 2 From the days of Hippocrates, the psychologic asso-
ciation of guilt and fear with the normal biologic occurrence of
menstruation has been known to result in mental disturbances. 3
In 1931 Frank wrote a vivid description of premenstrual
tension and ascribed its somatic and psychic symptoms to the
heightened levels of estrogen.4 Since this report diverse conclu-
* A.B., Western Michigan College of Educ. & L. Arts, and a Third Year
Student at Cleveland-Marshall Law School.
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1 Oleck, H. L., The legal significance of premenstrual tension was first in-
dicated by Howard L. Oleck in Legal Aspects of Premenstrual Tension, 166
Internat. Record Med. 475 (1953); and see, Oleck, Damages To Persons &
Property, 252.2-252.5 (1957 revision).
2 Lam. (Jer.) 1:17.
3 Hippocrates: Oeuvres Completes, trans. into French by E. Littre, V. pp.
553, 702 and VII. pp. 275, 505.
4 Frank, R. T., Hormonal Cases of Premenstrual Tension, 26 Arch. Neur.
& Psychiatry, 1053 (1931).
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sions as to its causation have been suggested, with explanations
ranging from hormonal imbalance to purely psychosomatic fac-
tors. Morton has made the following comments concerning the
psychosomatic aspects of the syndrome: 5 "Physicians and oather
observers had felt (and many still do) that this condition is
essentially psychogenic. The recent popular acceptance of 'psy-
chosomatic medicine' with its emphasis on the intimate inter-
relationship between the mind and the body has insinuated
premenstrual tension as an instance of psychosomatic malfunc-
tion due to emotional factors."
"Unquestionably the emotional components do play a role in
premenstrual tension. However, while emotional disturbances
can and often do alter the functions of the endocrine glands, the
converse also holds true. Endocrine dysfunctions can definitely
influence the psychogenic factors and produce mental symptoms.
It has been noted recently that the prolonged use of ACTH or
cortisone has been found to produce psychotic manifestations in
some instances. The need for a psychiatric approach to endocrine
problems and an endocrine approach to psychiatric problems is
thus becoming more and more manifest. Not infrequently one
may ponder whether the primary disturbance is in the higher
centers of the central nervous system with secondary manifesta-
tions in the endocrine system, or vice versa."
Premenstrual tension is a term applied to a symptom complex
which begins about ten to fourteen days premenstrually, reaches
its peak shortly before menstruation, and disappears dramatically
following the onset of the menstrual flow .6 It is manifested by a
feeling of deep depression and/or anxiety, and is associated with
such symptoms as intense irritability and nervousness, insomnia,
fatigue, emotional instability, painful swelling of the breasts,
abdominal bloating, headaches, and increased appetite and thirst.
The prevalence of premenstrual tension in the female popu-
lation has been the subject of numerous surveys.7 , 8,9, 10 The
5 Morton, J. H., Editorial-Symposium on Premenstrual Tension, 166 In-
ternat. Record Med., 475 (1953).
6 Morton, J. H., Premenstrual Tension, 60 Am. J. Obstet. & Gynec., 343
(1950).
7 Israel, S. L., Premenstrual Tension, 110 J. A. M. A., 1721 (1938).
8 Suarez-Marias, E. L., The Pa hophlogi Syndramue of Premenstrual
Tension with Emphasis on the Psychiatric Aspect. 166 Internat. Record
Med., 475 (1953).
9 Lamb, W. M., Premenstrual Tension, 11 Am. J. Psychotherapy, 840 (1953).
10 Ferguson, J. H. and Vermillion, M. B., Premenstrual Tension, 9 Am. J.
Ob. & Gyn. (II), 615 (1957).
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frequency of premenstrual tension in otherwise normal women
in controlled series of tests ranges from 40% to 95%.
In June, 1957 Pennington made a survey among 1000 house-
wives, business women, and high school and college girls. This
survey produced the following facts: 11 95 percent suffered from
one or more symptoms of premenstrual tension. Eight per cent
of the symptoms were of psychogenic origin only; 19 per cent
were entirely somatic; 72 percent had components of both psy-
cogenic and somatic origin. Eight per cent had dysmenorrhea
alone and 92 per cent had other symptoms in addition to the
dysmenorrhea. Pennington concluded that "because the preva-
lence of this syndrome produces social disharmony in the home
and in business, and because of the economic loss caused by in-
efficiency, and even temporary disablement during the period,
this snydrome is an important field for research."
Causation and Psychosomatic Aspects
In some cases, premenstrual tension is due to a temporary
tendency toward positive water balance. The symptoms of ten-
sion coincide with days of water retention, and relief is obtained
by measures that impede or reverse the abnormal storage of
water. There is little agreement even on the cause of premen-
strual water detention. Some consider it to be the result of the
elaboration of the antidiuretic hormone from the posterior pitu-
itary.12, 3 14 Others attribute causation of premenstrual tension
generally to an estrogen-progesterone imbalance.'15 , 16 17, 18
Some research men have disagreed with this concept. Neither
could they obtain any evidence of a psychogenic etiology of this
condition. They observed a greater degree of tension in their
11 Pennington, V. M., Meprobamate (Miltown) in Premenstrual Tension,
164 J. A. M. A. 638 (June 8, 1957).
12 Robinson, F. H., Jr. and Farr, L. E.: The Relation Between Clinical Edema
and Excretion of Antidiuretic Substance in Urine, 14 Ann. Int. Med. 42
(1940).
Is Pendergrass, E. P., Hodes, P. J. and Griffith, J. Q., Jr., Irradiation of the
Pituitary Gland in Posterior Lobe Hyperfunction controled by Biologic
Tests, 46 A. J. Roent., 673 (1941).
14 Bickers, W., Premenstrual Tension, 245 N. E. J. Med., 453 (1951).
16 Morton, J. H., supra, note 5.
16 Kroger, W. S. and Freed, S. C., Psychosomatic Gynecology, Philadelphia,
W. B. Saunders Co. (1951).
17 Ferguson, J. H. and Vermillion, M. B., supra, note 10.
18 Pennington, V. M., supra, note n.
3Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1957
PSYCHOTIC PREMENSTRUAL TENSION
cases, as indicated by changes in the electroencephalogram. 19 But
this says nothing about causation.
Some have concluded that the somatic factors are primary,
and that the psychic factors follow. Others have questioned this
view. In truth the causation of premenstrual tension is simply
not yet clear. Thus far, a neurologic origin seems to be most prob-
able, according to some medical authorities.
19a
Psychosomatic Symptoms
Regardless of the disagreement as to etiology and prevalence,
the medical experts are in agreement as to the scientific existence
of premenstrual tension as a medical entity. It also is obvious
that a tremendous and unestimated toll is taken by this physical
and mental disability.
Medical studies reveal that women suffering from the se-
verest form of premenstrual tension have periodic and spectacular
alterations of personality, with bizarre manifestations, including
psychotic episodes.20 For example, one patient, 32 years old,
had severe tension which rendered her almost psychotic for
about ten days each month. In order to get relief, as well as to
protect her family, she deliberately became pregnant five times
in seven years in order to prevent the menstrual cycle. 21 The
same report illustrated cyclic marital discord with the case of a
husband who frantically phoned for help because his wife was
threatening him with a knife, stating that "she does this the same
time every month."
Premenstrual tension occurs more frequently and with
greater severity in emotionally unstable women. Their mental
and nervous symptoms often become intense at the height of the
syndrome. The clinical picture is a psychoneurosis or a functional
nervous disorder. 22 Increased anxiety and tension occur pre-
19 Lamb, W. M., Ulett, G. A., Masters, W. H., and Robinson, P. W., Pre-
menstrual Tension: EEG Hormonal and Psychiatric Evaluation, 109 Am. J.
Psych., 840 (1953). It is interesting to note that several members of the
Cleveland-Marshall Law Review Medical Advisory Board questioned the
value of this reference, as saying nothing about causation.
19a Dr. Carl B. Wasmuth, Cleveland Clinic Hospital, personal communica-
tion.
20 Williams, E. Y. and Weekes, L. R., Premenstrual Tension Associated with
Psychotic Episodes; Preliminary Report, 116 J. Nerv. & Ment. Dis., 321
(1952).
21 Kroger, W. S. and Freed, S. C., supra, note 17.
22 Gray, L. A., 34 South. Med. J., 1004 (1941); Novak, E., 13oston, Little,
Brown & Co., pg. 540 (1941); Thomas, W. A., 101 J. A. M. A., 1126 (1933).
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menstrually,23 and it is also observed that inmates of mental
institutions are more difficult to manage during their pre-
menstrual periods. The mental upheaval at this period can be so
great that the patient is temporarily manic.24
Criminologists recently have pointed out the serious socia-
logic implications of premenstrual tension as a causative factor
in crimes of passion and violence. It is known that suicide and
crimes are more common at this time.2 5 Cooke indicated that 84
per cent of all crimes of violence in Paris committed by women
are perpetrated during the premenstrual and early menstrual
cycle.26
Prompted by these known anti-social attitudes and mental
disturbances of women in the premenstrual phase, Morton and
his associates2 7 conducted a controlled clinical study of inmates
at the Westfield State Farm, a state prison and reformatory for
women at Bedford Hills, New York.
The findings were as follows:
(1) Review of the inmates' records indicated that 62 per
cent of crimes of violence were committed in the premen-
strual week and 17 per cent during menstruation.
(2) Sugar tolerance tests showed a hypoglycemic type
curve in the premenstrual phase, and premenstrual vaginal
smears indicated hypoestrongenic stimulation.
(3) Seventy-nine per cent of inmates reported improve-
ment when given medication (as described in the report)
plus supplementary high protein diet. Medication in this
phase of the study is held to be effective on symptoms of
premenstrual tension rather than the underlying estrogen-
progesterone imbalance.
23 McCance, R. A., Luff, M. C., and Widdowson, E. E., Physical and Emo-
tional Periodicity in Women, 37 J. Hyg., 571 (1937); Benedek, T. and Ruben-
stein, B., Correlation between Ovarian Activity and Psychodynamic Proc-
esses, 1 Psychosomatic Med., 461 (1939).
24 Wittkower, E. D., and Cleghorn, R. A., Recent Developments in Psycho-
somatic Medicine, J. B. Lippincott Co., pg. 221 (1952).
25 Hanse, A., Beitrag Zur Frage der Menstruellen Neurosen und Psychosen,
71 Arch..F. Psychiat., 643 (1924); Allen, E. B., and Henry, G. W., The Rela-
tion of Menstruation to Personality Disorders, 13 Am. J. Psychiatry, 239
(1933).
26 Cooke, W. R., 49 Am. J. Obstet. & Gynec., 457 (1945).
27 Morton, J. H., Additon, H., Addison, R. G., Hunt, L. and Sullivan, J. J.:
A Clinical Study of Premenstrual Tension, 65 Am. J. Obstet. & Gynec.,
1182-91 (1953).
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(4) Results showed increased work output, improve-
ment in behavior and attitude, fewer requests for analgesic
and sedative medication, less punishment for infraction of
rules, and a marked increase in the general morale.
Legal Consequences
In terms of criminal law, a severe case of premenstrual ten-
sion, for criminal responsibility purposes, is analogous to the
defense of temporary insanity or incompetency. Temporary in-
competency or insanity is primarily a matter of subjective evi-
dence, is very difficult to prove, and is easily subject to abuse
as a rule of law. On the other hand premenstrual tension may
well be a matter of objective evidence, not too difficult to prove
in most cases. The eistence of premenstrual tension can be
verified by scientific tests on the basis of endometrial biopsies,
vaginal smears, basal temperatures, and urinary hormone assays.
These, of course, are much the same in all women. But the ele-
ment of spontaneous hypoglycemia, the stress lymphocyte, or
eosinopinea in severe cases suggest the possibility of proof after
the event which caused the legal action as well as before.27 a
These latter scientific facts promise to help to remove premen-
strual tension from the legal area of subjective and emotional
argument, and into the area of provable fact, subject to searching
tests according to the established rules of evidence. Further re-
search along this line is much to be desired.
Since the defense of premenstrual tension is analogous in
law to the defense of temporary incompetency or insanity, a dis-
cussion of the controversial rules of law pertaining to insanity
should be attempted.
Insanity is a purely legal term for mental disorder. It con-
notes a mental disorder so severe that the individual is adjudged
not responsible for his acts. Few principles of law have been
subjected to more consistent criticism than the right-wrong test
for insanity promulgated by the famous M'Naghten's Case.28 The
trial of Daniel M'Naghten, a paranoic with insane delusions, re-
sulted in acquittal on the ground of insanity. After the trial the
pressure of public reaction warranted a request by the House
of Lords that 15 judges give opinions upon the lasting laws gov-
erning insanity. The questions proposed to the judges were spe-
cifically limited to the case of a person afflicted with an insane
27a Wasmuth, Medical Evaluation of Mental Pain and Suffering, 6 Clev.-
Mar. L. R. 7 (1957).
28 Daniel M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (1843).
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delusion as M'Naghten was. Fourteen of the judges agreed on
two major rules necessary in order to establish a defense on the
ground of insanity:
(1) "It must be clearly proved that, at the time of the com-
mitting of the act, the party accused was laboring under
such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as
not to know the nature and quality of the act he was
doing or
(2) if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing
what was wrong." 
29
Since then, the right-wrong test enunciated by that case,
though condemned as being unscientific and based on fallacious
principles by the overwhelming weight of medical authority, has
nevertheless been tenaciously adhered to by a great many courts
as the only safe standard under which there can be had a proper
administration of justice. Some of the courts recognize the
validity of the contentions of the medical authorities, but fear the
practical consequences of enlarging the avenue of escape from
criminal responsibility."0
If the criticism which brands M'Naghten's Rule as medieval,
formalistic, and wholly divorced from medical reality3 l is a
sound criticism, an indictment of the American judiciary should
follow, for the great majority of jurisdictions in this country
have embraced M'Naghten's Rule both in name and in principle.32
29 The Rule is most often quoted as follows: "to establish the defense of
insanity, it must clearly be proved, that at the time of conunitting the act
the accused was laboring under such a defect of reason from disease of mind
as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or if he did
know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong." Daniel
M'Naghten's Case, supra, note 28.
30 Anno., 70 A. L. R. 659.
31 Hall, Mental Disease and Criminal Responsibility, 45 Columbia L. R.,
677 (1945).
32 The following jurisdictions follow the right-wrong test:
Arizona, State v. Macias, 60 Ariz. 93, 131 P. 2d 810 (1943).
California, People v. Ximball, 5 Cal. 2d 608, 55 P. 2d 483 (1936).
Florida, Collins v. State, 88 Fla. 578, 102 S. 880 (1925).
Idaho, State v. Van Vlack, 57 Idaho 316, 65 P. 2d 736 (1937).
Iowa, State v. Buck, 205 Iowa 1028, 219 N. W. 17 (1928).
Kansas, State v. White, 112 Kans. 83, 209 P. 660 (1922).
Maryland, Taylor v. State, 49 A. 2d 787 (Md., 1946).
Minnesota, State v. Simenson, 195 Minn. 258, 262 N. W. 638 (1935).
Mississippi, Brummett v. State, 181 S. 323 (Miss., 1938).
Missouri, Eisenhardt v. Siegal, 343 Mo. 22, 119 S. W. 2d 810 (193b).
Nebraska, Fisher v. State, 140 Neb. 216, 299 N. W. 501 (1941).
Nevada, State v. Skaug, 63 Nev. 59, 161 P. 2d 708 (1945).
New Jersey, State v. Rodia, 132 N. J. L. 199, 39 A. 2d 484 (1944).
(Continued on next page)
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The M'Naghten Rule reflected the psychological thinking and
morality of its period. The test assumed that "there is a separate
little man in the top of one's head called reason whose function
it is to guide another unruly little man called instinct, emotion,
or impulse in the way he should go." 33
The revolutionary psychological progress in the past one
hundred years informs us that reason is not the only regulator of
conduct. The Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry reflects
modem medical thought on the ineptness of the M'Naghten Rule
by saying: 34
"The Rule places a premium on intellectual capacity and pre-
supposes behavior is actuated exclusively by reason and untram-
meled choice. On the one hand, this overemphasizes the im-
portance of the intellect, reason, and common sense; on the other
hand, it under-emphasizes the emotional pressures that energize
behavior. Actually, in the psychic effort to rationalize forbidden
behavior with reality, reason and choice are more often observed
in bolder relief after the act."
The report of the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment
contained the following criticism of the M'Naghten Rule: 35
"The M'Naghten test is based on entirely obsolete and mis-
leading conception of the nature of insanity, since insanity does
(Continued from preceding page)
New York, People v. Schmidt, 216 N. Y. 324, 110 N. E. 945 (1915).
North Carolina, State v. Hairston, 222 N. C. 455, 23 S. E. 2d 885 (1943).
North Dakota, State v. Throndson, 49 N. D. 348, 191 N. W. 623 (1922).
Ohio, State v. Frohner, 150 Ohio St. 53, 80 N. E. 2d 868 (1948).
Oklahoma, Kennamer v. State, 59 Okla. Cr. 146, 57 P 2d 646 (1936).
Oregon, State v. Wallace, 170 Ore. 60, 131 P. 2d 222 (1942).
Pennsylvania, Commonwealth v. Daverse, 364 Pa. 623, 73 A. 2d 405 (1950).
South Carolina, State v. Anderson, 181 S. C. 527, 188 S. E. 186 (1936).
Tennessee, McElrou v. State, 146 Tenn. 442, 242 S. W. 883 (1922).
Texas, Stout v. State, 142 Tex. Cr. R. 537, 155 S. W. 2d 374 (1941).
Washington, State v. Marsh, 185 P. 2d 486 (Wash., 1947).
West Virginia, State v. Fvans, 94 W. Va. 47, 117 S. E. 885 (1923).
Wisconsin, State v. Johnson, 233 Wisc. 668, 290 N. W. 159 (1940).
Wyoming, State v. Brown, 60 Wyo. 379, 151 P. 2d 950 (1944).
33 Holloway v. U. S., 148 F. 2d 665, 667 (D. C. Cir., 1945).
34 Committee on Psychiatry and Law of the Group for the Advancement of
Psychiatry, Report No. 26, p. 4 (1954).
85 Report of the British Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, 1949-
1953 (80 Sept., 1953): "It is well established that there are offenders who
know what they are doing and know it is wrong (whether wrong is taken
to mean legally or morally wrong) but are nevertheless so gravely affected
by mental disease that they ought not be held responsible for their actions.
It would be impossible to apply modern methods of care and treatment in
mental hospitals and at the same time to maintain order and discipline, if
the great majority of the patients, even among the grossly insane, did not
know what is forbidden by the rules, and that if they break them, they are
liable to forfeit some privilege."
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not only, or primarily, affect the cognitive or intellectual fa-
cilities, but affects the whole personality of the patient, including
both the will and the emotions. An insane person may therefore
often know the nature and quality of his act and that it is wrong
and forbidden by law, but yet commits it as a result of the mental
disease."
The medical advances since the announcement of the
M'Naghten. test magnify the unrealistic nature of the formula,
and have caused leaders in all the related fields to voice their
disapproval of the continued usage of the rule.36 The criticism
heaped upon this archaic rule comes from the country's foremost
physicians,3 7 psychiatrists, 38 jurists,3 9 and criminologists.4"
As a result of the endless war of criticism waged against the
M'Naghten Rule, a minority of jurisdiction have supplemented
the right-wrong test, which considers only the cognitive aspect
of the intellect, by adopting the irresistible impulse doctrine. This
doctrine takes into consideration the volitional elements of the
personality. Despite the contentions and fears of their majority
brethren, these minority jurisdictions have felt that the right-
wrong test should be expanded to include the principle that, since
criminal intent is a necessary element in most crimes, one who
by the reason of a mental disease is driven to the commission of
a criminal act, by an impulse which he is powerless to control,
is not a voluntary agent and can have no criminal intent, and is
therefore .guilty of no crime where intent is a necessary element.
Irresistible impulse is defined in American Jurisprudence as
an impulse induced by, and growing out of, some mental disease
affecting the volitive, as distinguished from the perceptive
powers, so that the person afflicted, while able to understand
the nature and consequences of the act charged against him and
to perceive that it is wrong, is unable, because of such mental
disease, to resist the impulse to do it.
36 Bortz, W.. The Durham Case, 24 U. Cincinnati L. R., 110 (1955).
37 Alvarez, W. C., Medical Roundup, Cleveland Plain Dealer .... (1957):
"Because of our stupid, outmoded, futile and unworkable laws defining in-
sanity, these people no matter how 'crazy' they may be in the eyes of their
family, their acquaintances and their physicians, have to be adjudged sane."
38 Menninger, The Human Mind, 449-450 (1937 Ed.).
30 In a statement prepared for the Royal Commission on Capital Punish-
ment, Justice Frankfurter has declared: "If you find rules that are, broadly
speaking, discredited by those who have to administer them . . .they are
honored in the breach and not in the observance .. .I think the M'Naghten
rules are in large measure shams."
40 Professor Glueck, one of the nation's foremost criminologists, undermines
the rule from a legal-expediency viewpoint as well as from a psychological
standpoint. Psychiatry and the Criminal Law, 14 Va. L. R., 155, 161 (1928).
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"It is to be distinguished from mere passion or overwhelming
emotion not growing out of and connected with a disease of the
mind. Frenzy arising solely from the passion of anger and
jealousy, regardless of how furious is not insanity." 41
This doctrine, in recognizing that a person may be cognizant
of the wrongfulness of his act, and yet be unable to resist the
urge to execute the act, was a vital step towards bridging the
gap between medical and legal thinking on mental illness. In
1886,42 when the first state accepted the doctrine of irresistible
impulse, hope ran high that other jurisdictions would recognize
the soundness of the doctrine and adopt it as a highly necessary
supplement to the M'Naghten Rule. In the seventy years that
have since passed, only about fifteen states have adopted the
doctrine.43
The principal reasons for not recognizing this doctrine, even
where the incompetency is the product of mental diseases have
been said to be: (1) one who knows the difference between right
and wrong cannot have an irresistible impulse; 44 (2) it is difficult
to prove that there is an irresistible impulse.45
41 14 Am. Jur., 793, Criminal Law (35).
42 Parsons v. State, 81 Ala., 577, 2 S. 854 (1886). The court, in repudiating
the M'Naghten Rule, holds that where there is capacity to choose between
right and wrong, nevertheless the accused is not legally responsible if by
reason of the duress of mental disease "he has so far lost the power to
choose between right and wrong, and at the same time, the alleged crime
was so connected with such mental disease, in the relation of cause and
effect, as to have been the product or offspring of it solely."
43 Jurisdictions following the doctrine of "irresistible impulse":
Arkansas, Green v. State, 64 Ark. 523, 43 S. W. 973 (1898).
Alabama, Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 577, 2 S. 854 (1886).
Colorado, Ryan v. People, 60 Colo. 425, 153 P. 756 (1915).
Connecticut, State v. Saxon, 86 A. 590 (Conn., 1913).
Georgia, Rozier v. State, 185 Ga. 317, 185 S. E. 172 (1938).
Kentucky, Cline v. Commonwealth, 248 Ky. 609, 59 S. W. 2d 577 (1933).
Illinois, People v. Moor, 355 Ill. 393, 189 N. E. 318 (1934).
Indiana, Morgan v. State, 190 Ind. 411, 130 N. E. 528 (1921).
Louisiana, State v. Lyons, 113 La. 959, 37 S. 890 (1904).
Montana, State v. Keerl, 29 Mont. 508, 75 P. 362 (1904).
Michigan, People v. Quimby, 134 Mich. 625, 96 N. W. 1061 (1903).
Massachusetts, Commonwealth v. McCann, 325 Mass. 510, 91 N. E. 2d
214 (1950).
New Mexico, State v. White, 58 N. Mex. 324, 270 P. 2d 727 (1954).
Utah, State v. Green, 78 Utah 580, 6 P. 2d 177 (1931).
Vermont, State v. Watson, 49 A. 2d 174 (Vt., 1946).
-Virginia, Thurman v. Commonwealth, 107 Va. 912, 60 S. E. 99 (1908).
44 "The possibility of the existence of such a mental condition is too doubt-
ful." Cunningham v. State, 269 (Miss., 1879).
45 Justice Summerville, in Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 577, 2 S. 854 (1886),
refutes this argument when he states: "It is no satisfactory objection that
the rule (Irresistible Impulse Test) announced by us is difficult of applica-
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Sheldon Glueck criticizes the Irresistible Impulse as well as
the right-wrong tests. "Their employment as such neglects the
fundamental notion of the unity of the mind and interrelation-
ship of mental processes and the fact that a disturbance in the
cognitive, volitional, or emotional sphere, as the cause may be,
can hardly occur without its affecting the personality as a whole
and the end conduct flowing from the personality." 4
6
During the years that have elapsed since the doctrine was
first adopted, the medical profession, having delved deeper into
the psychological and mental make-up of the individual, no longer
considers the irresistible impulse test to be a satisfactory supple-
ment to the M'Naghten Rule. Today the overwhelming majority
of psychiatrists seek the abolition of the irresistible impulse doc-
trine as well as of the right-wrong test.
"Psychiatry today has advanced beyond the point where addi-
tion of the irresistible impulse test could be deemed adequate to
remedy the deficiencies of the right-and-wrong test. Both tests
fail to give due emphasis to the fundamental concept that the
mental processes are interdependent and interrelated. .. "
"Projective psychological tests have demonstrated how mental
disorder affects every facet of the intelligence. Both of the es-
tablished tests fail particularly to provide adequate bases for
judging severe psychoneurotics and others whose criminal acts
often seem to stem from unconscious motivations . . ."
"All of us, the normal as well as those not so normal, are more
inftuenced b1j our emotions than b reasoning. Although the
actor may be conscious of only one motive, his mental attitude
and his physical behavior in response to a given stimulus or
situation is almost certainly the end product of a complex of
psychological processes. The criminal, even more than the rest
of us, may be largely unaware of the reasons for his behavior.
Of this, the legal tests take no cognizance whatever." 47
The Royal Commission on Capital Punishment found the
doctrine unsatisfactory because it: "carries an unfortunate and
misleading implication that, where a crime is committed as a
result of emotional disorder due to insanity, it must have been
suddenly and impulsively committed after a sharp internal con-
(Continued from preceding page)
tion. The rule in M'Naghten's Case is equally obnoxious to a like criticism.
The difficulty does not lie in the rule but is inherent in the subject of
insanity itself."
48 Glueck, Crime and Correction, Mass., Addison-Wesley Press, Inc. (1952).
4T Guttmacher and Weihofen, Psychiatry and the Law, pp. 414-415 (1952).
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ffict. In many cases, such as those of melancholia, this is not
true at all. The sufferers from this disease experience a change
of mood which alters the whole of his existence. It may be cool
and carefully prepared: yet it is still the act of a madman." 48
From this limited study of the two tests it can be concluded
that the greatest objection to them is that they fail to take into
consideration the total mental picture of the accused, and in so
doing greatly limit the psychiatric expert in his testimony. How-
ever inadequate these rules have been for testing criminal re-
sponsibility, the courts have continued their use with all the
stubborn tenacity that stare decisis can imply.
Response to a century-long demand for a medically and
psychologically accurate formula to determine criminal responsi-
bility, came from the Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia in 1954 in the case of Durham v. United States.49 Monte
Durham was convicted of housebreaking by the District Court
sitting without a jury, after a waiver of his right to jury trial.
The only defense asserted at the trial was that Durham was of
unsound mind at the time of the offense. Durham had a long
history of imprisonment and hospitalization which indicated a
profound personality disorder. Durham's conviction followed the
lower court's rejection of the defense of insanity because the de-
fendant did not establish to the satisfaction of the court that at
the time of the crime he was of unsound mind in the sense that
he didn't know the difference between "right and wrong," or
that even if he did, he was not subject to an irresistible impulse"
by reason of a derangement of mind. The lower court held that
the usual presumption of sanity governs because: "there is no
testimony concerning the mental state of the defendant as of the
date the crime was committed, while if there was 'some testi-
mony' 50 as to his mental state as of that date to the effect that he
48 Supra, note 35.
49 Durham v. United States, 214 F. 2d 862 (D. C. Cir., 1954).
50 The District of Columbia rule is that all defendants are presumed sane,
but once the defense shows "some evidence" of insanity, then the burden
shifts to the prosecution to prove sanity, like all other elements of crime,
beyond a reasonable doubt. On the first ground for reversal, the court in
the instant case found that the alienist's testimony that Durham was insane
on the date of the offense, together with the testimony of Durham's mother
as to his behavior at this time, was "some evidence" of insanity, hence re-
butting the initial presumption of sanity and shifting the burden of proof
back to the prosecution. There is a split of authority on the question of
burden of proof. About half the states follow the rule of the present case.
Most of the others, including Ohio, place the burden on the accused to
establish his insanity by a preponderance of the evidence or some similar
measure of persuasion. 9 Wigmore, Evidence, 359; Sec. 2501 (3rd Ed., 1940
and Supp. 1951, p. 107).
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was competent on that date, the burden of proof would be on the
government to overcome it."
The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the lower court
was in error in failing to find "some evidence." The Appeals
Court was of the opinion that since the requirement of "some
evidence" was satisfied, the presumption of sanity failed and the
burden of proof then shifted to the prosecution to prove the de-
fendant's sanity beyond a reasonable doubt.
In a well-reasoned opinion, Judge Bazelon traced the ex-
perience of courts in their search for a suitable test to determine
the accountability of an insane defendant. The right-wrong and
irresistible impulse tests were labeled inadequate, in the follow-
ing language:
"We find that as an exclusive criterion the right-wrong test
is inadequate in that (a) it does not take sufficieit account of
psychic realities and scientific knowledge and (b) it is based upon
one symptom and so cannot validly be applied in all circum-
stances. We find that the 'irresistible impulse' test is also in-
adequate in that it gives no recognition to mental illness charac-
terized by brooding and reflection and so relegates acts caused
by such illness to the application of the right-wrong test. We
conclude that a broader test should be adopted." 51
The court invoked its inherent power to adopt a new test,
thus:
"The rule we now hold must be applied on the retrial of this
case and in future cases is not unlike that followed by the New
Hampshire Courts since 1870.52 It is simply that an accused is
not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the product
of mental disease or mental defect." 53
Defect and disease are specifically defined as follows:
"We use 'disease' in the sense of a condition which is con-
sidered capable of either improving or deteriorating. We use
'defect' in the sense of a condition which is not considered capable
of either improving or deteriorating, and which way be either
congenital, or the result of injury, or the residual effect of a
physical or mental disease." 54
The Durham test reflects modern theory by abandoning the
terminology of earlier standards of insanity, and substituting
51 Durham v. U. S., supra, note 49, at p. 874.
52 State v. Pike, 49 N. H. 399 (1870).
5a Durham v. U. S., supra, note 53, at 874-875.
54 Id., at 875.
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language consistent with modern psychiatric concepts and clinical
experience. The Durham test seems preferable because it gives
the jury greater freedom in determining the relative impor-
tance of each symptom or factor.
Although this new test permits the jury to consider every
aspect of the defendant's mental condition, it does riot furnish a
standard for measuring how serious the "mental disease" must
be in order to relieve the defendant of responsibility; but pre-
sumably the disease should have progressed to a reasonably
serious state. Nor does the court explain what degree of actual
connection between the defendant's mental abnormality and his
act is necessary for acquittal, but presumably again this connec-
tion must be substantial. Indeed modem psychiatry recognizes
that it is impossible to ascertain the exact amount of influence
an abnormal condition of mind has on criminal behavior.
55
Catholic University Law Review6 reported an interview with
Dr. Winfred Overholser,57 one of the leading authorities in
America on Forensic Psychiatry, who presented his views con-
cerning the Durham decision, thus:
"At the outset, Dr. Overholser expressed his enthusiastic ap-
proval of the ruling of the Court of Appeals of the District of
Columbia. 'Psyciatrists, in giving expert testimony as to the
mental condition of the defendant at the time of the criminal act,
need no longer play the role of a pseudo-doctor or pseudo-lawyer.
Since he is no longer confined within the narrow limits of the
antiquated tests, the psychiatrist is now free to present to the
jury his complete analysis of the defendant's mental condition'."
Dr. Overholser was pleased and proud over the fact that the
District is the first jurisdiction to follow the New Hampshire
Rule. Since the New Hampshire rule is broad enough to include
the 'Knowledge and Impulse' test, he favors the continued use of
these tests as additional aids to the broadened ruling. "We should
be willing to consider anything which will help us to arrive at
a proper diagnosis of the defendant's mental state."
In the new instructions of the Durham decision, Dr. Over-
holser does not think that the court's use of the terms "mental
disease" and "mental defect" should present any problem to the
55 68 Harv. L. R., 364-366 (1954).
56 Yeager and Consalvo, A Proposal for a Fountainhead of Rationality in
The Jurisprudence of Insanity, 5 Catholic U. L. R., 63-87 (1954-55).
57 Dr. Winfred Overholser, Sup't. of St. Elizabeth's Hospital, Professor of
Psychiatry at George Washington School of Medicine.
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psychiatrist. He considers the court's definition of these terms
to be psychiatrically accurate. Although the court's definition of
"mental disease" offers no distinction between severe psychoses
and mild neuroses, Dr. Overholser feels that the common sense
of the average jury will prevent the acquittal of a defendant
suffering only from a mild mental disorder. He considers the
present theorizing that the new ruling will effectuate a succession
of acquittals to be ill-founded. The effect of the test in this regard
in all probability will be negligible. The new rule has not caused
any epidemic of acquittals in New Hampshire.
Dr. Overholser agreed with the interviewers that there exists
a conflict of rights: the right of the public to be protected on the
one hand, and the right of the person legally irresponsible for
crime to be relieved of punishment; and that the public's right to
protection takes precedence until the hospitals are in a position
to accept additional commitments.
The eminent psychiatrist offered the suggestion that the dis-
cretionary power of the judge concerning the commitment and
examination of the acquitted-defendant should be replaced with
a tightened mandate which requires the commitment to a mental
hospital of all those acquitted by reason of insanity, there to be
detained until they can be released without danger to the public.
"The protection of society is the important thing, whether the
detention be in a prison or in a hospital."
Dr. Overholser summed up his opinion of the new ruling by
stating, in effect, that although long in arriving, it is a hopeful
sign that the gap between psychiatry and the law is narrowing.
One can readily conclude from even this cursory discussion
of the present legal rules governing insanity that medical prog-
ress in the field of mental abnormality has left the law far be-
hind. Although the medical profession has reached no universal
agreement on a substitute formula for a test of responsibility,
there is a wide acceptance of the conclusion that where there is
a medically recognized mental disorder resulting in a significant
distortion of social judgment, the accused should not be held
responsible. Fortunately, most modern legal realists understand
that law is largely a somewhat tardy philosophic synthesis of
rules based on general acceptance of scientific and social con-
clusions.58 The significance of the Durham decision is clear. For
the first time in almost seventy years (more than "somewhat
58 Friedman, W., Legal Theory, London, Stevens & Sons, Ltd., Chapter 17
(1949).
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tardy"), there has been an actual and vivid showing that a court
will take notice of the law's shortcomings, and will create prec-
edents more in accord with scientific reality.
The scientific reality displayed by the court in the Durham
case is the type of realistic thinking that is necessary in order to
effect the acceptance of premenstrual tension as a legal fact.
Although the medical profession unequivocally accepts the
existence of premenstrual tension as a settled scientific fact, it is
constantly working and encouraging research to determine the
extent of the tremendous toll taken by this common syndrome.
Eichner and Waltner 59 say: "In all probability the greatest toll
taken by premenstrual tension results from the nervous and
mental symptoms, especially when these are severe. Obviously
the woman with premenstrual migraine, irritability, insomnia,
depression and other mental disturbances cannot be expected to
function efficiently in her role as a member of the family, or in
her relations with her associates in the social and business worlds.
Disharmony at home, antagonism among friends, and inefficiency
in industry inevitably result from such disturbances. In the
milder cases the damage may not be disastrous. However, an in-
creasing amount of evidence indicates that many domestic
tragedies may be attributed in part to the effects of premen-
strual tension. Many unpremeditated criminal acts performed
by women occur during the premenstrual phase of their cy-
cles. .. ."
Another comment was: "Too many physicians are inclined
to dismiss their importance because the symptoms are seldom
incapacitating, and thus deny the patient specific treatment. Un-
doubtedly such an attitude springs from the failure to evaluate
properly the end results of uncontrolled premenstrual tension.
Frequently sight is lost of the fact that the subject herself may
be unaware of the extent of the impact of her disturbance on
others. Far too often her difficulties are attributed to imaginary
antagonism of her associates. To label these acts and complaints
as neurotic or hypochondriacal is a serious error in judgment of
the physician, and this may lead to disaster." 60
rresent Conclusions
This writer is not so optimistic as to presume that immediate
acceptance of this physical and mental disability as a legal fact
59 Eichner, E., and Waltner, C., Premenstrual Tension, Medical Times (1955).
60 Pollak, 0., The Criminology of Women, Univ. Penna. Press (1950).
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is likely. In view of the seventy year battle merely to secure a
formula on insanity which was consistent with modern medical
thinking, one cannot afford to be too optimistic. But the law
can not forever be pure philosophy completely divorced from
the scientific facts of life.
Some facts speak for themselves. In the years since the
beginning of modern investigation of premenstrual tension as a
scientific fact, estimates of women suffering from varying symp-
toms of this syndrome have tended to increase (from 40 to as
much as 95 per cent). Sociologists are becoming increasingly
aware of the important role premenstrual tension plays in many
domestic tragedies. The actual degree to which the conduct of
women is affected by this disability is as yet undetermined. The
serious effects of premenstrual tension on the mental and physical
reactions of the average female are probably grossly under-esti-
mated. Only time and further extensive research will conclu-
sively prove the relation between this disability and illegal acts,
of either a criminal or civil nature, committed by women.
Until legislation or cases build a structure of law dealing with
the subject, every attorney should consider the possible accept-
ance of premenstrual tension as a legal fact. Perhaps soon ob-
jective evidence of the existence of disabling premenstrual ten-
sion will be able to be verified by scientific tests. Especially does
spontaneous hypoglycemia suggest the possibility of use of mod-
em charting methods for developing scientific proof of a physical
condition after the event causing litigation as well as before. But
even now the attorney should consider the possibilities of this
common syndrome in connection with any legal problem affect-
ing a female client.
Never have the medical and legal professions made a greater
effort to reach accord over mutual problems than at this present
time."' But legal theorists who insist that the medical profession
has adjusted to the majority rules on insanity are either indulg-
ing in wishful thinking or whistling in the dark. The medical
profession has been forced into the ignominious position of ad-
justing to legal rules which are based upon assumptions abso-
lutely contrary to the prevailing point of view of the medical
profession.
Those entrusted with administering justice must be ex-
tremely prudent in accepting novel principles which the test of
61 Cleveland-Marshall Law Review's "Medical Advisory Editors" testify
eloquently to such efforts.
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time may prove to be incorrect. Conversely the law must also
battle the danger of being overcautious and of impeding true
progress. Conservatively speaking, a seventy year wait for the
Durham Rule seems at least to border on the overcautious. It is
to be hoped that this innate conservatism of the legal profession
will not prevent lawyers from keeping open minds as to the ac-
ceptance of premenstrual tension as a legal fact. And this is said
with full awareness of the fact that clear medical proof of its
exact nature is yet to be established.
As time and further research will eventually reveal the ex-
tent of the relation between criminal acts of women and pre-
menstrual tension, so will time and experience test the effective-
ness of the Durham Rule. Time may prove that the great strength
of the Durham Rule lies in its very presently-criticized vague-
ness. The rule is most often criticized because it does not pro-
nounce as a matter of law what symptoms are sufficient for a
finding of mental irresponsibility. Why should the rule restrict
its application to the scientific facts of today? The facts as to
mental illness are not all known. They may be endless in their
variety. The same is true of facts concerning premenstrual ten-
sion. They too are scientific facts to be determined and inter-
preted by the expert witness, leaving to the jury the drawing of
the conclusion of criminal responsibility.
Justice Somerville, in Parsons v. State,6 2 an outstanding ex-
ample of legal reasoning, made some observations which apply
so perfectly to the modern legal problems posed by the scientific
existence of premenstrual tension, that I shall quote him verbatim
and rest my case:
"It will not do for the courts to dogmatically deny the pos-
sible existence of such a disease, or its pathological and physical
effects, because this is a matter of evidence, not of law, or judicial
cognizance. Its existence and effect on the mind and conduct of
the patient is a question of fact to be proved, just as much as the
possible existence of cholera or yellow fever formerly was before
these diseases became the subject of common knowledge.... The
courts could with just as much propriety, years ago, have denied
the existence of the Copernican system of the universe, or the
efficacy of steam and electricity as a motive power. These are
scientific facts, first discovered by experts before becoming mat-
ters of common knowledge. So, in like manner, must be every
unknown scientific fact in whatever profession or department of
knowledge."
62 Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 577, 2 S. 854 (1886).
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